A well-known result of Ladner says that the satis ability problem for K45, KD45, and S5 is NP-complete. This result implicitly assumes that there are in nitely many primitive propositions in the language; it is easy to see that the satis ability problem for these logics becomes linear time if there are only nitely many primitive propositions in the language. By way of contrast, we show that the PSPACE-completness results of Ladner and Halpern and Moses hold for the modal logics K n ; T n ; S4 n , n 1, and K45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n , n 2, even if there is only one primitive proposition in the language. We go on to examine the e ect on complexity of bounding the depth of nesting of modal operators. If we restrict to nite nesting, then the satis ability problem is NP-complete for all the modal logics considered, but S4. If we then further restrict the language to having only nitely many primitive propositions, the complexity goes down to linear time in all cases.
Introduction
In Halpern and Moses 1992; Ladner 1977] , the complexity of the satis ability problem for various modal logics is characterized. For the single-agent case, Ladner showed that for K, T, and S4, the problem is PSPACE-complete, while for K45, KD45, and S5, it is NP-complete. Halpern and Moses showed that if we allow two or more agents, the satis ability problem for all these logics is PSPACE-complete. 1 All the lower bound results implicitly assume that there are an unbounded number of primitive propositions in the language. This is a standard assumption in such complexity results. Indeed, if we consider propositional logic, if the set of primitive propositions is nite and has size, say, K, then the satis ability problem becomes linear time: To test the satis ability of a formula ', we simply test each of the 2 K truth assignments, and see if any of them satis es '.
While the assumption that there are in nitely many primitive propositions in the language is standard, it might not always be reasonable. One might well be interested in the complexity of reasoning about knowledge and belief in a particular application, where there are only, say, 10 primitive propositions. Do we get linear time algorithms in this case? It is easy to see that in the three cases where we had NP-completeness before|K45, KD45, and S5|the complexity of satis ability drops to linear time when there are only nitely many primitive propositions, just as it does with propositional logic. However, as we show in this paper, for all the cases where we had PSPACE-completeness before, we still get PSPACE-completeness even if there is only one primitive proposition in the language. The upper bound, of course, follows immediately from the upper bounds in Halpern and Moses 1992; Ladner 1977] ; bounding the number of primitive propositions can only make things easier. The lower bounds apply a technique that may be of independent interest: We isolate some key properties of primitive propositions that are needed to prove the lower bound, and show that the existence of an in nite pp-like (primitive-proposition-like) family of formulas su ces for the proof. We then show how to construct such an in nite family for each of the logics in question, using formulas that involve only one primitive proposition.
A closer look at the PSPACE lower bounds shows that, except in the case of S4, they make crucial use of formulas with deeply nested occurrences of modal operators. What happens if we restrict the depth of nesting of modal operators to some xed k? First suppose we have an in nite number of primitive propositions in the language. In the case of S4 n , little changes.
As long as we allow formulas of depth k 2, the PSPACE lower bound still holds. On the other hand, for all the other logics, the complexity goes down to NP-complete: the lower bound is immediate since all these logics contain propositional logic, while the upper bound follows easily from the algorithms given in Halpern and Moses 1992; Ladner 1977] .
What happens if, in addition to having a bound on the depth of nesting, we also assume that the language has only nitely many primitive propositions? In that case, the complexity goes down to linear time for all the logics we are considering. The new and old results are summarized in Table 1 , where the rst row describes the results of Halpern and Moses 1992; Ladner 1977] , and the remaining rows describe the results of this paper; is the set of primitive propositions. As these results show, both depth of nesting and the number of primitive propositions in the K45, KD45, S5 S4 n , n 1 K n , T n , n 1; K45 n , KD45 n , S5 n , n 2 in nite, unbounded depth NP-complete The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brie y review the semantics of the various logics we are interested in, and discuss why the satis ability problem for K45, KD45, and S5 is linear time if there is a bound on the number of primitive propositions. In Section 3, we prove the PSPACE lower bound in row 2 of the table. In Section 4, we discuss the e ects of bounding the nesting of modal operators. We conclude in Section 5.
A brief review of modal logic
We brie y review some standard notions of modal logic here. Further details can be found in, for example, Chellas 1980; Halpern and Moses 1992; Hughes and Cresswell 1968] .
In this paper we focus on six logics known as K n , T n , S4 n , K45 n , KD45 n , and S5 n . The subscript n in all these logics is meant to emphasize the fact that we are considering the n-agent version of the logic. We omit it when considering the single-agent case. The language we use for all these logics is propositional logic augmented by the modal operators K 1 ; : : :; K n , where K i ' can be read \agent i knows (or believes) '". Formally,
we start with a nite or in nite set of primitive propositions. The set of modal formulas, denoted L n ( ), is the least set containing ' closed under conjunction, negation, and application of K 1 ; : : :; K n . Thus, if ' and are formulas in L n ( ), then so are '^ , :', and K i '.
Consider the following collection of axioms:
P. All instances of axioms of propositional logic K. We get various systems by combining some subset of K, T, 4, 5, and D with P, R1, and R2. In particular, we get K n by combining K with P, R1, and R2, T n by adding T to these axioms, S4 n by adding 4, S5 n by adding 5, K45 n by deleting T from S5 n , and KD45 n by adding D to K45 n . Numerous other modal logics can be constructed by considering other combinations of axioms.
We give semantics to all these logics by using Kripke structures. A Kripke structure is a tuple (W; ; K 1 ; : : :; K n ), where where W is a set of worlds, associates with each world a truth assignment to the primitive propositions, so that (w)(p) 2 ftrue; falseg for each world w and primitive proposition p 2 , and K 1 ; : : :; K n are binary accessibility relations.
Recall that a binary relation K on W is re exive if (w; w) 2 K for all w 2 W, transitive if (u; v) 2 K and (v; w) 2 K implies (u; w) 2 K, Euclidean if (u; v) 2 K and (u; w) 2 K implies (v; w) 2 K, and serial if for all w 2 W, there is some w 0 such that (w; w 0 ) 2 K. Let M n ( ) be the class of all Kripke structures for the language L n ( ). Thus, in every structure in M n ( ), the interpretation gives semantics to the primitive propositions in , and there are accessibility relations K 1 ; : : :; K n . We restrict M n ( ) by using superscripts r, s, t, and e, to denote re exive, serial, transitive, and Euclidean, structures, respectively. Thus, M rt n ( ) denotes the class of all structures where the K i relations are re exive and transitive knowledge, M est n ( ) denotes the class of all structures where the K i relations are Euclidean, serial, and transitive, and so on.
A situation is a pair (M; w) consisting of a Kripke structure and a world w in M. We give semantics to formulas with respect to situations. If p is a primitive proposition, then (M; w) j = p if M (w)(p) = true. Conjunctions and negations are dealt with in the standard way. Finally,
As usual, we say that a formula ' is valid in a structure M, written M j = ', if (M; w) j = ' for all worlds w in M. We say that ' is valid with respect to a class N of structure if M j = ' for all structures M 2 N. Similarly, we say that ' is satis able with respect to N if (M; w) j = ' for some M 2 N and some world w in M.
It is well known that there is a close connection between conditions placed on K and the axioms. In particular, T corresponds to the K i 's being re exive, 4 to the K i 's being transitive, 5 to the K i 's being Euclidean, and D to the K i 's being serial. Thus, we get the following result (see Chellas 1980; Hughes and Cresswell 1968; Halpern and Moses 1992] for proofs): Theorem 2.1: K n (resp. T n , S4 n , KD45 n , K45 n , S5 n ) is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language L n ( ) with respect to M n ( ) (resp. M r n ( ), M rt n ( ), M est n ( ), M st n ( ), M ret n ( )). 2 An S-situation (for S 2 fK n ; T n ; S4 n ; K45 n ; KD45 n ; S5 n g) is a situation (M; w) where M satis es the appropriate restriction; thus, for example (M; w) is a S4 n -situation if M 2 M rt n ( ). We say that a formula is S-satis able if it is true in some S-situation.
In the single-agent case of KD45 n , K45 n , and S5 n , we can consider a simpler class of structures. We de ne a K45 situation to be a pair (W; w), where W is a set of truth assignments that, intuitively, characterize the worlds the agent considers possible, and w is a truth assignment that, intuitively, characterizes the \real world". A KD45 situation is a K45 situation (W; w) such that W 6 = ;. An S5 situation (W; w) is a K45 situation such that w 2 W.
We again give semantics to formulas with respect to situations. If p is a primitive proposition, then (W; w) j = p if p is true under truth assignment w. Conjunctions and negations are dealt with in the standard way. Finally,
It is well known (again, see any of Chellas 1980; Hughes and Cresswell 1968; Halpern and Moses 1992] for a proof) that a formula is provable in K45 (resp. KD45, S5) if and only if it is true in all K45 (resp. KD45, S5) situations.
Notice that if we start with a nite set of primitive propositions, there are 2 j j truth assignments to the propositions in , and hence no more than 2 2 j j 2 j j K45 (resp. KD45, S5) situations. Checking whether a formula ' is satis ed in any one of these situations can be done in time linear in the length of j'j (see Halpern and Moses 1992, Proposition 3 .1]). Thus, to see if ' is satis able, we can simply check each of these structures. Since the number of structures is independent of the size of ', we get: Proposition 2.2: If is nite, deciding if a formula is K45-(resp., KD45-, S5-) satis able can be done in linear time.
Note that if is in nite, the number of structures we have to check is not independent of the formula (it depends on the number of primitive propositions in the formula), so this argument fails.
The PSPACE lower bounds
We begin by reviewing the lower bound proofs of Halpern and Moses 1992; Ladner 1977 ], since we plan to follow the same strategy here. The proofs proceed by a reduction from the logic of quanti ed Boolean formulas (QBF). For our purposes, we can take a QBF to be of the form Q 1 p 1 Q 2 p 2 : : :Q m p m A 0 , where Q i 2 f8; 9g and A 0 is a propositional formula whose only primitive propositions are among p 1 ; : : :; p m . Thus, a typical QBF is 8p 1 9p 2 (p 1 ) p 2 ). We can determine whether a QBF is true or false by successively replacing each subformula of the form 8p i (B) by B 0^B1 and each subformula of the form 9p i (B) by B 0 _ B 1 , where B 0 (resp. B 1 ) is B with all occurrences of p i replaced by true (resp. false), and then using the standard rules of propositional logic. Note that this successive replacement results in a formula that may be much larger than the original formula (in fact, exponential in the size of the original formula). It is known that the problem of determining which QBFs are true is PSPACE-complete Stockmeyer and Meyer 1973] .
Following Halpern and Moses 1992] , we present the lower bound proof for S4, and then show how to modify it to deal with all the other logics. Suppose we are given a QBF A = Q 1 p 1 : : :Q m p m A 0 . We construct a formula S4 A that is satis able in a structure in M rt 1 i A is true. The idea is to use S4 A to force the structure to look like a tree of truth assignments. Each of the leaves of the tree encodes a distinct truth assignment to the primitive propositions p 1 ; : : :; p m that appear in A. If A is satis able, then we want this tree to contain all the truth assignments necessary to show that A is true.
We proceed as follows. We take as primitive propositions p 1 ; : : :; p m ; d 0 ; : : :; d m+1 , where d i denotes depth at least i in a \tree" of truth assignments. Notice that the number of propositions used depends on A. As the depth of A increases, we need more and more primitive propositions. This is precisely where the proof implicitly assumes that the set of primitive propositions is in nite (although, of course, for any xed A, we use only nitely many of them). Let depth be the following formula, which clearly captures the intended relation between the d i 's:
Let determined be a formula that intuitively says that the truth value of p i is determined by depth i in the tree, in that if p i is true (resp. false) at a given node s of depth j with j i, then it is true (resp. false) at all the K-successors of s of depth at least i. (If we restrict to structures that look like trees, then all the K-successors of s will have depth i + 1; however, there may be nonstandard structures satisfying this formula that do not look like trees, and we need to be able to deal with these as well.)
Let branching A be a formula that intuitively says that if Q i+1 , the (i + 1)st quanti er in A, is 8, then each node s at depth i in the tree has two successors of depth i + 1, one at which p i+1 is true, and one at which p i+1 is false, while if Q i+1 is 9, then s has at least one successor of depth i + 1 (which intuitively gives p i+1 the truth value which results in A being true). A ) is satis able in a structure M r 1 ( ) (resp., M 1 ( ), M et 2 ( ), M est 2 ( ), M ret 2 ( )).
This proves all the other PSPACE-hardness results. As we observed above, this proof seems to make crucial use of the fact that we have an unbounded number of primitive propositions in . In addition, the depth of nesting of the K operator in the formulas constructed is unbounded in the case of all logics other than S4. We defer the issue of depth to the next section, and focus here on the number of primitive propositions required, showing how the proof can be carried out with only one primitive proposition in the language. We rst need to isolate what properties of primitive propositions we actually use. One property we obviously use is that primitive propositions are independent. To make this precise, given any formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' m , we de ne an atom over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m to be one of the 2 m formulas of the form ' 0 1^: : :^' 0 m , where ' 0 i is either ' i or :' i . We say that ' 1 ; : : :; ' m are independent with respect to logic S if each of the atoms over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m is S-consistent. But independence alone does not su ce. For example, our proof implicitly uses the fact that both p i^: K:p i+1 and p i^: Kp i+1 are satis able. But suppose ' 1 is p and ' 2 is Kp. Then ' 1 and ' 2 are easily seen to be independent with respect to K, yet we have that ' 2 ) K' 1 is valid.
We can construct similar examples for each of the other logics we are interested in. We need a notion that is stronger than independence. What we really want to be able to do is to construct an arbitrary tree of truth assignments to ' 1 ; : : :; ' m , as we did for the primitive propositions in our lower bound proof.
To make this precise, we de ne a tree formula over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m inductively to be either an atom over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m or a conjunction of the form ^:K: 1^: : :^:K: k , where is an atom over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m and 1 ; : : :; k are tree formulas over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m . We can think of a tree formula as describing a tree, each of whose nodes is labeled by a truth assignment to the propositions ' 1 ; : : :; ' m . We say that the formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' m are completely independent with respect to a logic S if each tree formula over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m is S-consistent. Finally, we say that an in nite family ' 1 ; ' 2 ; : : : of formulas is pp-like for a logic S if each nite subset of these formulas is completely independent with respect to S. Clearly, any in nite set of distinct primitive propositions is indeed pp-like, no matter what the logic. Our goal is to construct pp-like families of formulas ' 1 ; ' 2 ; : : : for each of the logics of interest to us that involve just one primitive proposition in such a way that the length of the formula ' n is polynomial in n. Once we do this, we can replace the primitive propositions that appear in formulas such as K A by the pp-like formulas; it is easy to see that the lower bound proof then goes through unchanged. Thus, we can view the notion of a pp-like family as encapsulating what we really needed from primitive propositions in our lower bound proof.
Constructing a pp-like family for the logic K is quite simple: Let q j , j 1, be the formula :K:(:p^:K j :p). It is easy to see that q j is true at a state s precisely if there is a path of length j + 1 starting at s whose second state satis es :p and whose last state satis es p. This argument no longer works for T. The problem is that in T, q j ) q j 0 is valid if j 0 j: if there is an appropriate path of length j + 1 to a state satisfying p, re exivity guarantees that there will also be longer paths. We deal with this as follows. Let r 1 be q 1 , and let r j be an abbreviation for q j^: q j?1 for j > 1. Thus, r j says that there is an appropriate path of length j to p, but no shorter paths. It is easy to see that the r j 's are satis able and mutually exclusive. Moreover, the formulas :K:r j , j = 1; 2; : : :, form a pp-like family for T. Thus, we can replace the occurrences of p 1 ; : : :; p m ; d 0 ; : : :; d m+1 in T A by :K:r 1 ; : : :; :K:r 2m+2 , respectively, and still get the PSPACE lower bound in this case.
This argument breaks down for S4. In transitive structures, it is easy to see that q j , q j 0 is valid for all j; j 0 , so r j is inconsistent! In fact, it can be shown that there is no in nite pp-like family for S4 if we have only a nite number of primitive propositions in the language. We can get an in nite family satisfying a slightly weaker property though, as we now explain. Consider the PSPACE lower bound proof again. We say that a formula ' is evident in structure M if the formula ' ) K' is valid in M. Notice that if S4 A is satis able, then it is satis able in a structure where all the primitive propositions are evident. In the case of the primitive propositions d 0 ; : : :; d m+1 that are meant to denote the depth, it is clear that we want them to be evident. As for the propositions p 1 ; : : :; p m , notice that we can make them all false at the root. In fact, we can make p i false at all nodes of depth less than i (i.e., at all nodes not satisfying d i ). To satisfy the formula branching A , there may need to be nodes of depth i satisfying p i , but once p i is true at such a node, the formula determined guarantees that it remains true. Thus, in the structure constructed in this way, each primitive proposition p i is evident.
We de ne an evident tree formula over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m inductively to be either an atom over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m or a conjunction of the form ^:K: 1^: : :^:K: k , where is an atom over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m and 1 ; : : :; k are evident tree formulas over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m such that if ' i appears as a conjunct of , then :' i does not appear as a conjunct of 1 ; : : :; k . Thus, an evident tree formula describes a tree whose nodes are labeled with truth assignments to the propositions ' 1 ; : : :; ' m with the added property that if ' i is true at a node, it is true at all the successors of that node|i.e., , ' i is evident|for i = 1; : : :; m. We say that the formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' m are weakly independent with respect to a logic S if each evident tree formula over ' 1 ; : : :; ' m is S-consistent. Finally, we say that an in nite family ' 1 ; ' 2 ; : : : of formulas is weakly pp-like for a logic S if each nite subset of these formulas is weakly independent with respect to S. Of course, a pp-like family is weakly pp-like, but the converse may not hold. By our observations above, to get a PSPACE lower bound for S4, it actually su ces to construct a weakly pp-like family for S4. We now show how to do this. Fortunately, as we observed above, it su ces to have a weakly pp-like family to get the lower bound, so we still get the PSPACE lower bound in the case of S4. These techniques will not give us a weakly pp-like family in the case of K45, KD45, or S5. Indeed, we cannot nd a weakly pp-like family if we have only a nite number of primitive propositions and one agent in these cases. But once we have two agents, it is easy to check that we obtain a pp-like family for each of K45 n , KD45 n , and S5 n , n 2, by replacing each occurrence of K in the family q 1 ; q 2 ; : : : constructed for T by K 2 K 1 . We again leave details to the reader.
We can summarize this discussion by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1:
1. The satis ability problem for the logics K, T, and S4 is PSPACE-hard with respect to the language L 1 (fpg).
2. The satis ability problem for K45 2 , KD45 2 , and S5 2 is PSPACE-hard with respect to the language L 2 (fpg).
Bounding the depth
As we have seen, the PSPACE lower bound for K n , T n , n 1, and K45 n , KD45 n , S5 n , n 2, uses formulas with unbounded nesting of the modal operators. What happens if we bound the depth?
To make this precise, we formally de ne the depth of nesting in a formula ', denoted depth('), as follows: We de ne depth(p) = 0 if p is a primitive proposition, depth(:') = depth('), depth('^ ) = max(depth('); depth( )), and depth(K i ') = 1 + depth('). Thus, the formulas of depth 0 are precisely the propositional formulas, and a formula such as K 1 (K 2: K 2 K 2 q) has depth 3. Let L k n ( ) consist of all formulas in the language L n ( ) whose depth is at most k.
Notice that the formula S4
A has depth 2, independent of A. This shows that even if we restrict to L 2 n ( ), the PSPACE lower bound holds for S4 as long as has in nitely many primitive propositions. On the other hand, the formulas K A and T A have depth m + 2, where m is the number of primitive propositions in A. Is such unbounded depth really necessary?
As the upper bound proofs given in Halpern and Moses 1992; Ladner 1977] show, the answer is yes. Roughly speaking, for K n , T n , K45 n , KD45 n , and S5 n , n 1, if a formula of depth k is satis able at all, it is satis able in a structure which looks like a tree of depth at most k with outdegree at most the length of the formula. Thus, to check if a formula is satis able, it su ces to guess such a small treelike structure that satis es it. Since a treelike structure of depth k and outdegree m has fewer than m k+1 nodes, it follows that checking satis ability for formulas in L k n is in NP for these logics. Since all these logics contain propositional logic as a sublanguage, we immediately get that satis ability is NP hard. Thus, we get: Theorem 4.1: For any xed k, if is in nite, the satis ability problem for K n , T n , K45 n , KD45 n , S5 n , n 1, with respect to the language L k n ( ) is NP-complete.
By way of contrast, we have Theorem 4.2: Suppose is in nite.
(a) If k 2 the satis ability problem for S4 n , n 1, with respect to the language L k n ( ) is PSPACE-complete.
(b) The satis ability problem for S4 n , n 1, with respect to the language L 1 n ( ) is NPcomplete.
What happens if we further restrict to nite ? Theorem 4.3: For any xed k, if is nite, deciding if a formula in L k n ( ) is satis able with respect to any of the logics K n , T n , S4 n , K45 n , KD45 n , S5 n , n 1, can be done in linear time.
Proof: A straightforward induction on k shows that for each of these logics, there are only nitely many inequivalent formulas in L k n ( ). Indeed, given n and k, we can easily construct formulas ' 1 ; : : :; ' N such that every formula is equivalent to one of ' 1 ; : : :; ' N in the logic K n , and hence in all the other logics. Fix a logic S, and consider the subset of ' 1 ; : : :; ' N that is S-satis able. This means that there is a nite collection of structures M 1 ; : : :; M K (where K N), such that every formula in L k n ( ) that is S-satis able is satis able in one of these structures. Thus, to check if a formula ' is satis able, we simply check if it is satis able in each of these structures. This can be done in time linear in the size of '. (Of course, the constant depends on K and the size of the structures M 1 ; : : :; M K . While this means it may be huge, it is nonetheless a constant.)
We remark that since it is well known that, in the logics K45, KD45, and S5, every formula is equivalent to a depth-one formula Hughes and Cresswell 1968, p. 55] for these logics, 5 we do not need to bound k to get the linear time result (as we observed in Proposition 2.2).
Conclusions
We have shown the e ect of bounding the depth and bounding the number of primitive propositions on the complexity of reasoning about knowledge. Basically, we get linear time algorithms only in the case that our language is restrictive enough so that there are only nitely many inequivalent formulas. These results show how little it takes to get up to NP or PSPACE complexity.
Our results form an interesting contrast to those of Vardi 1986] . By working in the framework of Montague structures, which are more general than the Kripke structures we consider here, he is able to do a ne-grained analysis of which axioms cause the complexity of knowledge to increase. He shows that, in a precise sense, it is the property of closure under conjunction| (K'^K ) ) K('^ )|that increases the complexity of satis ability from NP to PSPACE if we have in nitely many propositions. It would be interesting to understand the e ect of restricting the depth and the number of primitive propositions in this more general framework as well. It would also be of interest to see the e ect of such limitations on other modal logics, such as temporal logic and dynamic logic. More generally, given a modal logic characterized by a collection F of frames Chellas 1980] (as S4 is characterized, for example, by the transitive re exive frames), it would be interesting to nd conditions of F that guarantee that the satisability problem is polynomial time (or NP or PSPACE) if we restrict the language to having only nitely many primitive propositions and/or nite depth of nesting.
